Backflashes in fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key
  distribution by Koehler-Sidki, A. et al.
Backflashes from fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution
Backflashes from fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in
quantum key distribution
A. Koehler-Sidki,1, 2 J. F. Dynes,1, a) T. K. Para¨ıso,1 M. Lucamarini,1 A. W. Sharpe,1
Z. L. Yuan,1 and A. J. Shields1
1)Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, Cambridge Research Laboratory,
208 Cambridge Science Park, Milton Road, Cambridge, CB4 0GZ,
United Kingdom
2)Engineering Department, University of Cambridge, 9 J. J. Thomson Avenue,
Cambridge CB3 0FA, United Kingdom
(Dated: 9 June 2020)
InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-
bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of such detectors from
ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The
phenomenon of backflashes, whereby APDs reemit photons after detecting a pho-
ton, gives Eve the opportunity to passively learn the information carried by the
detected photon without the need to actively interact with the legitimate receiver,
Bob. Whilst this has been observed in slow-gated detectors, it has not been in-
vestigated in fast-gated APDs where it has been posited that this effect would be
lessened. Here, we perform the first experiment to characterise the security threat
that backflashes provide in a GHz-gated self-differencing APD using the metric of
information leakage. We find that, indeed, the information leakage is lower than
that reported for slower-gated detectors and we show that its effect on the secure
key rate is negligible. We also relate the rate of backflash events to the APD dark
current, thereby suggesting their origin is the InP multiplication region in the APD.
PACS numbers: Valid PACS appear here
Keywords: Suggested keywords
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic security that is guar-
anteed by the laws of physics1. This property has spurred significant efforts in this research
area, culminating in a number of field trials2–8. With the recent deployment of QKD outside
of the lab, avalanche photodiodes (APDs) have presented themselves as the most promis-
ing single-photon detectors due to their ability to operate at room temperature9, excellent
detection efficiency10 and short dead-times11.
Whilst perfectly secure in theory, deviations of components from their ideal behaviour
can create security loopholes. Detectors are the most vulnerable devices in a QKD system
as they are exposed through the optical channel and therefore are the most accessible
component to Eve. One example exists in the form of the faked-state attack12, of which the
most notable implementation is the blinding attack. Demonstrations of this attack have
been presented on a variety of individual detectors and systems13,14, although several of
these have only been possible due to inappropriate operation rather than a genuine security
weakness15,16.
The aforementioned attacks are all examples of Eve actively interacting with the QKD
system, both by measuring Alice’s qubits and then illuminating Bob’s detectors. This
presents a significant chance of her presence being detected. It has been shown that APDs
are susceptible to emitting light after a detection, known as backflashes17–21. Backflashes
can then allow Eve to act in a more passive way and thus ascertain which of Bob’s detectors
has clicked without having to interact with any components in the QKD system. However,
no studies have yet been performed on fast-gated detectors that are used in state-of-the-
art QKD systems11. Whilst it has been suggested that faster gating, resulting in shorter
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gates and subsequently avalanches with less charge, would result in fewer backflashes17, this
hypothesis has not been experimentally verified.
In this paper, we present the first study on backflashes in GHz-gated self-differencing
APDs, key enablers in high bit rate QKD11. Our finding support the hypothesis that
faster gating, resulting in narrower gates and smaller avalanche charges, results in fewer
backflashes. Using the technique in Ref. 17, we quantify the information leakage and find it
to be 0.5%, which is an order of magnitude lower than the value measured for a MHz-gated
detector. Such a low information leakage has a negligible effect on the secure key rate.
To determine the potential vulnerability of a fast-gated APD, we perform a simple ex-
periment. An InGaAs/InP APD is chosen as the device under test. It is thermoelectrically
cooled to –30◦C where the breakdown voltage is 62.16V. When driven with a constant DC
bias of 59.66V and a peak-to-peak 1 GHz AC signal of 10V with 50% duty cycle correspond-
ing to 500 ps ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ times, respectively, the APD exhibits a detection efficiency of
17% at a wavelength of 1550 nm, a dark count probability of 1.9× 10−6 and an afterpulse
probability of 5%.
For investigating the effect of backflashes on the security of QKD, the APD is illuminated
with a 1550 nm pulsed laser diode with a pulse width of approximately 30 ps and repetition
frequency of 1/64 of the APD gating frequency (15.625 MHz). We use this laser repetition
frequency to only illuminate every 64th gate as this allows us to mitigate the addition of
afterpulses when determining the number of legitimate APD counts. If a faster frequency
were used, afterpulses could raise the APD detections and thus artificially lower the infor-
mation leakage. The flux is controlled using a variable optical attenuator. We illuminate
the APD with 0.1 photons/pulse, a flux typical for QKD, at the start of the APD gate. The
reasons for the placement of the pulse in this temporal location are twofold. Firstly, this
simulates the behaviour of the legitimate users, as the detection efficiency is greatest at the
start of the gate. Secondly, placing the pulse at the start of the gate gives the avalanches the
longest time to grow and therefore provides a maximum value of the backflash probability
and is therefore the more conservative estimate of information leakage. The light enters
port 1 of a circulator and port 2 is connected to the APD. Emitted backflashes then re-
enter the circular and exit via port 3, after which they are measured with a superconducting
nanowire detector (SNSPD). The detected APD counts and backflashes are interpreted with
a time-tagging single-photon counter. This is illustrated in Fig. 1(a).
In an ideal case, any light detected by the SNSPDs can be attributed to backflashes.
However, in the optical path are also detected and can artificially raise the SNSPD count
rate. An example of this is shown in the histogram of SNSPD detection events with the
APD DC and AC disabled, see red bars in Fig. 1(b). The peak features at approximately
17 and 49 ns can be attributed to backreflections from the APD surface and connector
between APD and circulator and they dominate the SNSPD detection events when the
APD is single-photon insensitive, as shown as the red bars in the same figure. The blue
bars corresponding to backflashes are reasonably uniformly distributed across the histogram,
with the exception of the second backreflected peak. At this point of approximately 49 ns,
the blue bars have a much larger amplitude (around 100 rather than 40) which suggests that
this peak corresponds to reflection from the APD surface itself and that the backflashes are
strongly correlated with APD detection events.
To quantify the effect of backflashes on QKD security, we use the metric of information
leakage, defined in Ref. 17 as
PL =
NB
NAηdetηch
, (1)
where NB is the number of detected backflashes (neglecting backreflections and dark
counts), NA is the number of detected valid APD counts (i.e neglecting dark counts), ηdet
is the detection efficiency of the monitoring detector (80% for the SNSPD used), and ηch is
the channel loss between the APD under test and the monitoring detector, measured to be
0.78.
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FIG. 1. (a) Schematic of the experiment used to investigate APD backflashes. LD: laser diode;
VOA: variable optical attenuator; SNSPD: superconducting single photon detector; TCSPC: time-
correlated single-photon counter. (b) Histograms of the detection events on the SNSPD when the
APD is illuminated with a 0.1 photons/pulse where the total measurement time is 10 seconds.
The x-axis refers to the effective delay with respect to the laser trigger pulse. The APD is biased
under two different DC biases: single photon sensitive (blue bars) and single photon insensitive
(red bars). (c) Subtracted histogram with backreflections removed, leaving only backflashes
In order to obtain a true measure of the information leakage, it was necessary to isolate the
backreflections. A simple technique for this is simply to neglect them in post processing.
This was done by subtracting the SNSPD histogram with the APD turned off, so that
only backflashes were measured, shown in Fig. 1(c). This large peak also at around 49 ns
supports the hypothesis given above that the backflashes are correlated with APD clicks.
Measurements were performed for different detection efficiencies by varying the DC bias to
the APD, and the subsequent information leakage then calculated and plotted as a function
of detection efficiency in Fig. 2 alongside the value measured in Ref. 17 for the ID 201
detector. The APD detection efficiency was determined at each point using the technique
outlined in22.
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FIG. 2. Information leakage plotted as a function of the APD single-photon detection efficiency.
The red star indicates the corresponding information leakage for a commercially available APD, ID
201, reported in the literature17. The detector under test exhibits an order of magnitude smaller
information leakage, supporting the hypothesis that faster-gated APDs emit fewer backflashes.
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The data appears initially very noisy at low efficiency. This is due to the SNSPD count
rate being similar to its dark count rate, which suggests the rate of backflashes is very
low. We note that it was not possible to extended the measurement time to smooth out
the statistics due to the instability of the APD’s temperature over time. The data then
appears much smoother from an efficiency of 10% as the rate of backflashes increases.
As the information leakage remains more or less constant from then on, this suggests the
relationship between backflashes and APD counts is linear. By comparing this to the ID
201 detector, we see an order of magnitude improvement in the information leakage, which
supports the hypothesis that shorter gates will emit fewer backflashes.
Using the value for information leakage, which is a direct measurement of Eve’s infor-
mation, we can derive a new secure key rate in the presence of backflashes. This has been
partially investigated in Ref. 18 where the authors approach the derivation of the key rate
from a photon number splitting perspective and treat the information leakage as ‘tagged’
bits, but originating from Bob rather than Alice23,24. However, the authors in Ref. 18 as-
sume the backflash probability, and therefore information leakage, remains constant over all
distances, which means they obtain a very pessimistic estimate for the secure key rate. This
is because they use the conditional backflash probability (i.e. the probability of a backflash
if there is an APD click), whereas the raw, absolute backflash probability would have been
more appropriate. In reality, as the information leakage is dependent on an APD click, the
APD click probability should also be incorporated into this analysis so that the key rate is
affected by the same proportion, regardless of distance. We use a modified version of the
key rate given in Ref. 18 considering single-photon BB84 as follows
R ≥ qPclick
[
(1− PL) {1− h(e)} − {fh(e)}
]
(2)
where q is the basis choice probability, Pclick is the probability of a click on a detector, PL
is the information leakage (defined in equation 1), h(x) is the binary Shannon entropy, e is
the quantum bit error rate and f is the error correction efficiency. It is interesting to note
that by simply multiplying the information leakage term by the click probability in the key
rate definition from Ref. 18, thereby including a dependence of the backflash probability
on the APD detection probability, that equation reduces to equation 2.
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FIG. 3. Secure key rate plotted in the absence of backflashes, with the measured information
leakage and previous state-of-the-art. Even with PL = 6%, the effect on the key rate is negligible,
as the term PL gives the exact amount by which the key rate is reduced.
Using detector characteristics from this study we plot the key rate as a function of distance
for several values of information leakage, namely zero, 5 × 10−2, which was the previous
state-of-the-art and 5× 10−3, as measured in our own setup, as shown in Fig. 3.
As an information leakage of 0.5% has a negligible effect on the key rate, an isolator
would not be needed as a countermeasure since even with a very low insertion loss of 0.2
dB, it would have a greater impact on the key rate. This result provides strong evidence
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that backflashes are not a significant threat to QKD, even for slower gated detectors where
the information leakage is potentially larger. We note, however, that characterising the
spectrum of the backflashes is also important for enforcing this point in order to more
accurately determine the information leakage. Whilst this has been partially explored in
previous studies18–20, these have not corrected for the spectral response of the measurement
apparatus. We believe this is an important avenue for future work, not only from a security
perspective but also to shed light on the precise origin of backflashes within APDs.
Whilst we have shown that backflashes have a small effect on the secure key rate, they can
still pose a security risk. As shown in Ref. 17, the temporal profile of backflashes appears
to be unique for different APDs. This can provide Eve with information on the detectors
used by Bob, allowing her to use a tailored attack that is dependent on the type of APD in
Bob’s system. Therefore, the use of an isolate may still be desirable as a countermeasure.
As a second experiment to probe the origin of the APD backflashes, we switch off the
laser in and measure the backflashes with the APD kept under dark conditions. We measure
the SNSPD count rate as a function of the APD dark current by adjusting the DC bias to
the APD. The result is given in Fig. 4.
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FIG. 4. SNSPD count rate as a function of APD dark current. The linear relationship between
the two strongly points to backflashes originating in the InP multiplication region.
Initially the SNSPD count rate remains at the dark count level until the APD current
reaches a value of approximately 10 nA. After about 100 nA, the data appears to follow
a linear trend and this is confirmed by fitting the data points. This finding supports the
hypothesis that backflashes arise from carriers in the multiplication region; a higher dark
current arises from the larger electric field increasing the avalanche probability, thereby
generating more carriers which cause backflashes.
In conclusion, we have investigated backflashes in GHz-gated self-differencing InGaAs
APDs. By performing the first characterisation of the backflash rate in these devices using
high efficiency SNSPDs, we have found evidence that supports the hypothesis that shorter
gates lead to fewer backflashes. We have shown that the information leakage as a result
of backflashes has a negligible effect on the secure key rate in QKD and is, as such, of
minimal concern in QKD systems. We have performed characterisation indicates backflashes
originate in the detector’s InP multiplication region.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A. K.-S. gratefully acknowledges financial support from Toshiba Research Europe Ltd
and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council through an Industrial CASE
studentship.
Backflashes from fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution 6
1Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing.
In International Conference on Computers, Systems & Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, Dec 9-12,
1984, pages 175–179, 1984.
2M Peev, C Pacher, R Allaume, C Barreiro, J Bouda, W Boxleitner, T Debuisschert, E Diamanti, M Di-
anati, J F Dynes, S Fasel, S Fossier, M Frst, J-D Gautier, O Gay, N Gisin, P Grangier, A Happe,
Y Hasani, M Hentschel, H Hbel, G Humer, T Lnger, M Legr, R Lieger, J Lodewyck, T Lornser, N Ltken-
haus, A Marhold, T Matyus, O Maurhart, L Monat, S Nauerth, J-B Page, A Poppe, E Querasser,
G Ribordy, S Robyr, L Salvail, A W Sharpe, A J Shields, D Stucki, M Suda, C Tamas, T Themel, R T
Thew, Y Thoma, A Treiber, P Trinkler, R Tualle-Brouri, F Vannel, N Walenta, H Weier, H Weinfurter,
I Wimberger, Z L Yuan, H Zbinden, and A Zeilinger. The SECOQC quantum key distribution network
in Vienna. New Journal of Physics, 11(7):075001, 2009.
3M. Sasaki, M. Fujiwara, H. Ishizuka, W. Klaus, K. Wakui, M. Takeoka, S. Miki, T. Yamashita, Z. Wang,
A. Tanaka, K. Yoshino, Y. Nambu, S. Takahashi, A. Tajima, A. Tomita, T. Domeki, T. Hasegawa,
Y. Sakai, H. Kobayashi, T. Asai, K. Shimizu, T. Tokura, T. Tsurumaru, M. Matsui, T. Honjo, K. Tamaki,
H. Takesue, Y. Tokura, J. F. Dynes, A. R. Dixon, A. W. Sharpe, Z. L. Yuan, A. J. Shields, S. Uchikoga,
M. Legre´, S. Robyr, P. Trinkler, L. Monat, J.-B. Page, G. Ribordy, A. Poppe, A. Allacher, O. Maurhart,
T. La¨nger, M. Peev, and A. Zeilinger. Field test of quantum key distribution in the Tokyo QKD Network.
Opt. Express, 19(11):10387–10409, May 2011.
4J. F. Dynes, I. Choi, A. W. Sharpe, A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and A. J. Shields.
Stability of high bit rate quantum key distribution on installed fiber. Opt. Express, 20(15):16339–16347,
Jul 2012.
5Yingqiu Mao, Bi-Xiao Wang, Chunxu Zhao, Guangquan Wang, Ruichun Wang, Honghai Wang, Fei
Zhou, Jimin Nie, Qing Chen, Yong Zhao, Qiang Zhang, Jun Zhang, Teng-Yun Chen, and Jian-Wei Pan.
Integrating quantum key distribution with classical communications in backbone fiber network. Opt.
Express, 26(5):6010–6020, Mar 2018.
6A. R. Dixon, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich, A. W. Sharpe, A. Plews, W. Tam, Z. L. Yuan,
Y. Tanizawa, H. Sato, S. Kawamura, M. Fujiwara, M. Sasaki, and A. J. Shields. Quantum key distribution
with hacking countermeasures and long term field trial. Sci. Rep., 7(1):1978, 2017.
7Darius Bunandar, Anthony Lentine, Catherine Lee, Hong Cai, Christopher M. Long, Nicholas Boynton,
Nicholas Martinez, Christopher DeRose, Changchen Chen, Matthew Grein, Douglas Trotter, Andrew
Starbuck, Andrew Pomerene, Scott Hamilton, Franco N. C. Wong, Ryan Camacho, Paul Davids, Junji
Urayama, and Dirk Englund. Metropolitan quantum key distribution with silicon photonics. Phys. Rev.
X, 8:021009, Apr 2018.
8Wei Sun, Liu-Jun Wang, Xiang-Xiang Sun, Yingqiu Mao, Hua-Lei Yin, Bi-Xiao Wang, Teng-Yun Chen,
and Jian-Wei Pan. Experimental integration of quantum key distribution and gigabit-capable passive
optical network. Journal of Applied Physics, 123(4):043105, 2018.
9L. C. Comandar, B. Fro¨hlich, M. Lucamarini, K. A. Patel, A. W. Sharpe, J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan,
R. V. Penty, and A. J. Shields. Room temperature single-photon detectors for high bit rate quantum key
distribution. Appl. Phys. Lett., 104(2):021101, 2014.
10L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Frhlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, S. W.-B. Tam, Z. L. Yuan,
R. V. Penty, and A. J. Shields. Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically
seeded lasers. Nature Photonics, 10(5):312–315, April 2016.
11Zhiliang Yuan, Alan Plews, Ririka Takahashi, Kazuaki Doi, Winci Tam, Andrew Sharpe, Alexander
Dixon, Evan Lavelle, James Dynes, Akira Murakami, Mamko Kujiraoka, Marco Lucamarini, Yoshimichi
Tanizawa, Hideaki Sato, and Andrew J. Shields. 10-Mb/s Quantum Key Distribution. J. Lightwave
Technol., 36(16):3427–3433, Aug 2018.
12Vadim Makarov and Dag R. Hjelme. Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems. J. Mod. Opt.,
52(5):691–705, 2005.
13Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers, Christoffer Wittmann, Dominique Elser, Johannes Skaar, and Vadim
Makarov. Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination. Nat.
Photon., 4(10):686–689, oct 2010.
14Ilja Gerhardt, Qin Liu, Anta Lamas-Linares, Johannes Skaar, Christian Kurtsiefer, and Vadim Makarov.
Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a quantum cryptography system. Nature Commu-
nications, 2:349, jun 2011.
15Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields. Avoiding the blinding attack in QKD. Nat. Photon.,
4(12):800–801, 2010.
16Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J. Shields. Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright
illumination attacks in quantum cryptography. Appl. Phys. Lett., 98(23):231104, 2011.
17Alice Meda, Ivo Pietro Degiovanni, Alberto Tosi, Zhiliang Yuan, Giorgi Brida, and Marco Genovese.
Quantifying backflash radiation to prevent zero-error attacks in quantum key distribution. Light: Science
and Applications, 6(e16261), 2017.
18Paulo Vinicius Pereira Pinheiro, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Shihan Sajeed, Rolf T. Horn, Jean-Philippe
Bourgoin, Thomas Jennewein, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, and Vadim Makarov. Eavesdropping and counter-
measures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography. Opt. Express, 26(16):21020–21032, Aug
2018.
19Loris Marini, Robin Camphausen, Benjamin J. Eggleton, and Stefano Palomba. Deterministic filtering
of breakdown flashing at telecom wavelengths. Applied Physics Letters, 111(21):213501, 2017.
Backflashes from fast-gated avalanche photodiodes in quantum key distribution 7
20Yicheng Shi, Janet Zheng Jie Lim, Hou Shun Poh, Peng Kian Tan, Peiyu Amelia Tan, Alexander Ling,
and Christian Kurtsiefer. Breakdown flash at telecom wavelengths in InGaAs avalanche photodiodes.
Opt. Express, 25(24):30388–30394, Nov 2017.
21Christian Kurtsiefer, Patrick Zarda, Sonja Mayer, and Harald Weinfurter. The breakdown flash of silicon
avalanche photodiodes-back door for eavesdropper attacks? Journal of Modern Optics, 48(13):2039–2047,
2001.
22L. C. Comandar, B. Fro¨hlich, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe, M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty, and
A. J. Shields. Gigahertz-gated InGaAs/InP single-photon detector with detection efficiency exceeding
55% at 1550 nm. J. Appl. Phys., 117(8):083109, feb 2015.
23Daniel Gottesman, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus, and John Preskill. Security of Quantum Key
Distribution with Imperfect Devices. Quantum Info. Comput., 4(5):325–360, sep 2004.
24H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and D. Mayers. Unconditional security of practical quantum key distribution.
The European Physical Journal D, 41(3):599, Jan 2007.
